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University of Luxembourg
INTRODUCTION
It is quite possible that many Europeans – government officials, citizens and other res-
idents of Europe – assess the massacres committed in Paris in January and November
2015 as criminal incidents whose prevention could have been achieved, as far as such
a prevention is humanly possible, bymore adequate policing. There are no conclusive
grounds available for dismissing this assessment as spurious. Moreover, the relatively
unproblematic public acceptance of the discourse of the state of emergency that
slipped into the breach opened up by these awful events would seem to indicate wide-
spread support for this assessment. There are, nevertheless, many other citizens and
residents, with perhaps also some government officials among them, who do not find
this assessment convincing. There is another wide-spread view in Europe that consid-
ers the assessment of acts of jihadist terrorism as mere instances of criminality as a
grave over-simplification of the matter that contributes nothing to a deeper under-
standing of the socio-political problem that one is facing here. According to this view,
the assessment of these acts “as acts of war by an enemy of the people” also con-
tributes no significant insight in this regard, unless one is prepared to accept that
France has spiralled into a civil war in which (some of) the people have become an
enemy of (the rest of) the people. This Intervention article gives a voice to this other
view. As will become clear, it draws much support for the position it takes from Gior-
gio Agamben’s assessment of the politics of suppressing crime through adequate
policing as a politics that reacts only to the consequences of a deeper malaise with-
out endeavouring to identify and resolve the causes of this malaise.
The perspective that is offered in this article turns on the following key points. The
first is the assertion that a widespread if not dominant feature of contemporary Islam
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is the result of a long process of modernisation, the key thrust or ingredient of which
was the ‘de-hermeneuticisation’ of a religious culture that used to be informed by
highly sophisticated practices of textual and aesthetic interpretation. ‘De-hermeneu-
ticisation’ is the term that will be used in this article to denote the “process of be-
coming more fundamentalist (increasingly claiming complete access to absolute
truth) and less interpretive (decreasingly aware of the partiality and irreducibly pro-
visional status of all textual interpretation).” One aspect of the tide of religious rad-
icalisation among Muslims in Europe today can plausibly be attributed to this
‘de-hermeneuticisation.’ This, however, is indeed only one aspect. There are others,
and any honest attempt to identify them will not be able to ignore the widespread
observation that religious radicalisation in Europe takes place predominantly in
urban areas that suffer from endemically high unemployment rates, poverty, social
immobility, general criminality, and all the typical manifestations of the societal
malaise associated with these conditions. The Belgian neighbourhood Molenbeek
became the constant case in point in the press in the aftermath of the terror attacks
in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016.1 Hence the turn of the ar-
gument at this point toward a consideration of the factors that contribute to the con-
ditions of urban malaise sketched here. One of these factors, it then contends, can
plausibly be attributed to an inadequate constructive governmental intervention
aimed at rehabilitating these socially dysfunctional areas and integrating them into
the more functional strata of urban existence. “Whence this lack of a constructive
or reconstructive governmental intervention?” is the question that comes up next.
The standard answer to this question seeks to terminate further questioning by in-
voking a simple lack of resources, both human and financial. The problem with this
response is its attempt to present a lack of resources as a naturally given phenome-
non that no interventionist agenda can hope to avoid or overcome. The continua-
tion of the argument turns on the insistence that economic scarcity is never a
naturally given phenomenon in societies where vast pockets of surplus wealth re-
main exempted from the constructive redistribution of social resources. Under these
circumstances, ‘economic scarcity’ is a socially constructed phenomenon that un-
derpins and ‘justifies’ the exemption of vast concentrations of wealth from being
considered a resource for social reconstruction. The argument then moves to iden-
tify the key elements of this particular construction of resource deficiencies in Europe
today. It is for this purpose that it turns its focus to the school of economic thinking
that is widely perceived as the key to economic and financial governance in Europe
today, namely ordo-liberalism.
Ordo-liberalism is the name of a complex body of economic thinking that em-
anated from the writings of the so-called Freiburg school of economics in the time
of the Weimar Republic. The argument presented here does not offer a compre-
hensive assessment of the work of the Freiburg economists. It engages only with
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one salient feature of this school of economic thought, namely, its conspicuous dis-
regard for the continuous or periodic reconstructive wealth re-distribution that one
commonly associates with Keynesian economic thinking. Ordo-liberalism is not
averse to state intervention in the market – this is the major point of difference be-
tween classical laissez-faire liberalism and ordo-liberalism – but its concern with state
intervention is largely restricted to the role it attributes to the state as a guardian of
an economic order of undistorted free competition.2 Why might ordo-liberal think-
ing be so conspicuously unconcerned about the role of the state as the sovereign
guardian of a broader social order with the prerogative and mandate to cure or at
least keep in check the social ills that result from uneven distribution of economic
resources? The response that is offered to this question is quasi-Weberian: at the
root of ordo-liberal thinking is a Protestant ethic that turns on the conception of an
order – willed by God, as Walter Eucken puts it3 – of fair economic competition be-
tween virtuous and self-reliant individuals.
The very idea that some or other economic order effectively instantiates God’s will
surely requires that one considers the broader social order that accompanies that
economic order as part and parcel of God’s will. In other words, the very idea that
some economic order represents God’s will suggests that the seemingly intractable
social exclusions concomitant to that economic order also reflect His/Her will. Now,
if all of this holds true for the ordo-liberal economic organisation of Europe, one not
only finds oneself confronted with an economic order that turns on a Protestant
morality, but also with an unstated but full-blown Calvinist predestination theology
according to which the eschatological separation of the redeemed and the damned
is already manifest in current social divisions and exclusions.4
The line of reasoning expounded above allows and prompts one to make the fol-
lowing crucial observation: any theological realism that takes a current social order
with its contingent political and economic exclusions as a reflection of God’s eter-
nal will, evidently evinces a European, political-economic de-hermeneuticisation that
effectively mirrors the de-hermeneuticisation that knowledgeable observers – such
as Navid Kermani, to whose thoughts we turn below – attribute to contemporary
Islam. And, when one clings to this de-hermeneuticised theology of ordo-liberalism
in the face of significant risks of fatal bloodshed (reconciling oneself with this blood-
shed, in other words, by seeing it as an inevitable result of how things are), then this
theology also begins to evince elements of a suicidal extremism that parallels the
bizarre convictions of jihadist terrorists and suicide bombers in many respects.
The perspective elaborated in this article certainly requires a willingness from read-
ers and interlocutors to reconsider dominant views of looking at the problem or cri-
sis that one is facing here. The suggestion that one of the roots of the current wave
of jihad terror in Europe can be traced to a European fundamentalism that is as ex-
treme as the Islamic fundamentalism behind the terrorism, may well come across as
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counter-intuitive and even scandalous to some readers. For them, the easy as-
sumption that jihad terror is essentially an instance of criminality that simply calls for
more adequate policing may well have greater appeal, for it spares one the need to
consider a certain embarrassing complicity with those who stand accused ‘in the first
place’, so to speak. This perspective is nevertheless put forward here for the sake of
opening up other ways of thinking about the crisis Europe is facing today. It should
also be stressed that the endeavour to open up a different perspective here is not at
all accompanied by the claim that it offers a comprehensive or conclusive solution
to the crisis at hand. It is just a first step towards thinking differently about this crisis.
No doubt, the policing of jihad extremism will continue, and the suggestion here is
most certainly not that this must simply stop. The suggestion is only that one can and
must do more than just gravitating complacently to a fatalist acceptance of jihadism
as part and parcel of an ‘inevitable’ cycle of criminal violence and the police sup-
pression of this violence.
REIMS, SATURDAYMORNING, 14 NOVEMBER
When I woke up on Saturday morning, 14 November 2015, in Reims, France, I found
myself in the middle of a national state of emergency. It was the first time that I had
been in one since the extended states of emergency called by the apartheid gov-
ernment in South Africa in the 1980s. Looking through a hotel dining room window
at the eerily empty main street that leads from the station into the city, I commenced
to unpack my thoughts so as to put some order into them and to stop them from cir-
cling mindlessly around emotions of shock, dismay, and, no doubt, cruel and venge-
ful anger. It was precisely to try to put a stop to the pointless and thoughtless
emotions of anger and vengefulness to which horrifying bloodshed invariably moves
people – as the great René Girard, who recently passed away, taught us so well –
that I began to think more purposefully about the state of emergency to which the
whole of France woke up that Saturday morning. What did this state of emergency
mean, apart from that which it undoubtedly announced, namely, the suspension of
civil liberties and the extension of police powers? France was ready for this curtail-
ment of liberty for the sake of security, claimed Le Figaro confidently three days later
(Tuesday, 17 November). On that same day, however, Libération evinced a clearer
sense of what was dawning in France with the big black capital letters on its front
page: L’ETAT D’URGENCE PERMANENT – A PERMANENT STATEOF EMERGENCY.
The immediate background that elicited the assessment of the state of affairs by
Libération was, of course, François Hollande’s extension of the two weeks of the
state of emergency, called on Friday evening, to three months, which was done by
Monday evening. The larger background was the general sense among more per-
cipient observers that this state of emergency was not going to end in any foresee-
able future, even if it were to be recalled after three months, just like it had also not
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begun on that Friday or Tuesday evening, but long before. It had in fact begun so
long before that its commencement has become difficult to pinpoint. One would at
least have to go back to the introduction of new security legislation in France after
the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015, short on the heels of the substitution of
the Patriot Act with the New Freedom Act, through which the unofficial but effec-
tive state of emergency was extended in the United States.
Let us take a closer look at the political imagination that informs the kind of leg-
islation at issue here by recalling Giorgio Agamben’s engagement with the attrac-
tion to states of exception in theWestern political imagination. Agamben traces this
political imagination to the unstable distinction between actuality and potentiality in
the political metaphysics that the West inherited from Aristotle.5 The profound re-
flection on the institutions of the tumult and the exception in his analysis of the meta-
physics of potentiality and actuality provides an incisive and penetrating perspective
on the tumultuous times with which the 20th century ended and the 21st began. It is
from this profound background perspective that one must also understand his com-
ments on the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris in January 2015 during an interview
that Telerama conducted with him earlier this year.6
Telerama observes in the interview that France has passed fifteen anti-terrorist acts
since 1986, but all of this has not prevented the terror attacks in Paris in January.
This observation has surely become exponentially more pertinent in the wake of the
attacks of 13 November. How must one explain the evident failure and fallibility of
these statutes? Agamben’s response to this question is this: this type of security leg-
islation only facilitates ways of reacting to acts of terror, but the statutes do not at all
look into and address the causes of these acts. In fact, they create a governmental
regime of reacting to consequences instead of governing causes: “La conséquence
des politiques ultra-sécuritaires [est un] système qui abandonne toute volonté de
gouverner les causes pour n’agir que sur les conséquences.” One is surely justified
in considering this kind of government desperate.7 Excessive governmental reliance
on such laws surely tells the story of governments that have given up the hope that
something more constructive and incisive can be done to govern and marginalise
potential threats of terrorist attacks, instead of just reacting to them. Any govern-
mental action that is informed by this despair – this lack of more fundamental trans-
formative and therapeutic aspirations – would necessarily bear the mark of a
permanent state of emergency, irrespective of whether and when a state of emer-
gency is actually declared or recalled. Levels of alert may vary over time, but constant
alert necessarily becomes the core characteristic of a government that has resigned
itself to the containment of explosive situations.
Another core feature of such an incessantly desperate government is its dimin-
ishing capacity for historical self-understanding, that is, its increasing inability and un-
willingness to reinterpret itself in view of newly emerging realities that evidently
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render established codes of common understanding dysfunctional. This is the
thought that I wish to elaborate further in what follows with reference to the ‘de-
hermeneuticisation’ that is taking place in France and Europe today.
TOWARDS A CONCEPTOF ‘DE-HERMENEUTICISATION’
The term ‘de-hermeneuticisation’ is invoked in what follows to denote the increas-
ing resort to technocratic reactions to destructive social developments in contem-
porary Europe at the expense of responding to them in ways that seek to understand
why they arise. More generally speaking, however, it is also invoked here to denote
the process through which a culture becomes increasingly fundamentalist. It may
well come across as a rather clumsy term, but it is surely not more clumsy and may
well be less clumsy than other available ways of denoting this process of ‘becom-
ing increasingly fundamentalist.’ Moreover, it also helps one to understand this
process for what it is long before one arrives at the stage of the process where fun-
damentalism has become an undeniable feature of some or other culture. For in-
stance, it helps one to understand that all naturalist assumptions of ‘the way things
are’ already reflect a significant degree of ‘de-hermeneuticisation’ without having
become manifestly recognisable yet as instances of fundamentalism. Increasing re-
course to technocratic modes of government likewise reflects an increasing ‘de-
hermeneuticisation’ of a culture of government (or governance, rather) because
of the way it quite naturalistically takes a certain reality as given (‘just the way things
are’) and acts upon it with a means-ends logic. One can surely not consider all tech-
nocratic modes of government ‘fundamentalist,’ but the term ‘de-hermeneuticisa-
tion’ alerts one to the way in which increasing levels of technocratic government
are moving up on a scale of naturalisation at the end of which waits full-blown fun-
damentalism.
The resort to the term ‘de-hermeneuticisation’ that follows takes its cue from the
profound address given by Navid Kermani on the occasion of his acceptance of the
Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels on 18 October 2015.8 In his address, Ker-
mani describes the way in which Islamic cultures in many Arabic states have hard-
ened into non-interpretative modernist fundamentalisms that break away from the
interpretative traditions of cultural, aesthetic and textual engagement with the Koran
that informed earlier Islamic cultures. Kermani stresses that this turn in the thinking
of Islam is not restricted to the “sectarian” understanding of Islam that informs the
ISIS movement. It is much more pervasive in the Arabic world than we might want
to believe. His argument in this regard would seem to corroborate the point I make
in “The Literary Exception” regarding the need in Islamic theology for something
equivalent to the Pauline suspension of apocalyptic religious inclinations that
threaten to derail constructive institutionalisations of forceful religious sentiments.
The argument in “The Literary Exception” stresses the need to turn religious con-
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cerns with ultimate truth into interpretative concerns with an indefinitely postponed
truth or ‘truth.’ It is the indefinite postponement of the moment of ‘truth’ that al-
lows, in the meantime (in the time that remains, as Agamben calls it so beautifully9),
for the constructive enculturation of both religion and politics. It is this postpone-
ment that allows for interpretive religious traditions, on the one hand, and truly sec-
ular governments, on the other.
No doubt, religion often resists its own enculturation and the hermeneutic prac-
tices on which this enculturation turns, but as long as it remains sufficiently enlight-
ened about its own contingent and historical textuality, and the inevitability of its
textual status, religious resistance to enculturation – to its own enculturation, no-
tably through various modes of mysticism and negative theology – can play a sig-
nificant role in the absorption of unworldly yearnings that frustrate secularisation.
An effective sublimation of these yearnings by vibrant and powerful religious cultures
(and anti-cultures) can spare secular politics the yearning for ultimate moments of
truth such as is evident in the bizarre fundamentalist conviction regarding a final
battle between the army of Mohammed and the infidel armies of the rest of the
world that is a core element of the ISIS movement.10
It is, however, not with the de-hermeneuticisation of Islamic cultures that I wish to
take issue in what follows. I would like to look, instead, at the vast and increasing de-
hermeneuticisation that has taken root in European societies. This de-hermeneuti-
cisation of European societies, I will suggest, provides one with a key insight into
the way in which de-hermeneuticised conceptions of Islam have found their way
deep enough into the hearts and minds of startling numbers of European citizens to
move them to jihadism. Let us begin the short journey into European de-hermeneu-
ticisation with the disastrous and bloody confluence of the two de-hermeneuticisa-
tions at stake here, the European and the Arabic-Islamic, in Paris in January and
November 2015.
THEORDO-LIBERAL ‘DE-HERMENEUTICISATION’ OF EUROPE
François Hollande immediately ordered increased bombing of ISIS in Syria after
the massacre in Paris on 13 November. This response evidently suggested the cri-
sis that France is facing has its origins elsewhere. But Hollande himself could not ig-
nore for long the reality that the problem is not a distant one, but one that comes
from within France itself. He was candid enough to observe expressly that the mas-
sacres had been committed by French citizens in France: “Nous le savons et c’est
cruel de le dire, ce sont des français qui ont tué des autres français.”11 And, as if this
paradox was just too hard to stomach, he did not lose much time before turning to
solutions that might make the situation less paradoxical and less contradictory, less
indicative of the deep crack that is running through France, namely, the idea of
withdrawing French citizenship from anyone with two passports who is convicted
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of an act of terrorism, even from French citizens born in France.12 This suggestion
allowed him to find some comfort, it seems, in the idea that the problem is, after
all, related to foreign elements in France that can feasibly be expelled so as to ren-
der France more adequately and univocally French again. The move was a sym-
bolic one, but its desperation was glaringly evident for the world to see. The
removal of second passports from a relatively small number of duly prosecuted and
convicted terrorists was surely not going to make any significant dent on the real-
ity of scores of young French citizens who get drawn into radical Islamic funda-
mentalism today.13
France has to square up to the reality of scores of young and no longer so young
French citizens who do not feel French and never had a reason to feel French. It has
to face the fact of hundreds and thousands or hundreds of thousands of young and
old people who have in fact been expelled from France, not by forcing them out of
the country, but by forcing them into ghetto communities that effectively constitute
foreign countries in and around the major cities of France, from where they have no
hope whatsoever of actually emerging again one day. It is in these communities that
Islamic de-hermeneuticisation mostly takes root in France today (and in similar com-
munities elsewhere in Europe, notably Belgium; do we not all know the nameMolen-
beek by now?). These communities happen to be in France and in Europe, but they
are surely not part of France or Europe. The response of French politics to what we
have come to know as the banlieue-problem from several notorious uprisings over
the years has always been to simply contain the problem and prevent it from spread-
ing further. The question of actually integrating these communities into France has
often been mooted, also among political elites, but the discussion has never gone
anywhere. It is with regard to the evident resignation of French politics in the face
of the split between the banlieue and the rest of France that I wish to underline the
twofold de-hermeneuticisation that ultimately explains the paradox of “des français
qui [tuent] des autres français,” the paradox that Hollande believed might be ad-
dressed meaningfully by withdrawing a couple of passports.
One side of this twofold de-hermeneuticisation consists in the cynical acceptance
of social splits such as the one that increasingly divides France into relatively afflu-
ent neighbourhoods, on the one hand, and dismally poor ones, on the other.
Hermeneutics does not only concern the faculty of interpretation and re-interpre-
tation, but also the faculty of reinterpretation that might overcome splits and bridge
gaps.14 Societies that simply accept the kind of social disintegration that is conspic-
uous in so many cities of Europe today, have evidently given up on the imaginative
faculty of reinterpreting themselves in the hope of overcoming at least some of their
most destructive divisions.
The other side of this de-hermeneuticisation takes us to the root of the first.
The inability of European societies to reinterpret themselves with the aspiration
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to overcome their most destructive divisions (divisions that have now evidently
become murderous: “ils sont des français qui [tuent] des autres français”) should
prompt one to ask serious questions about the dominant mode of governmental
thinking that has practically reduced European politics to the structural mainte-
nance of a Europe-wide free market economy. Many observers attribute this dom-
inant mode of governmental thinking to the widespread endorsement among
European governmental elites of ordo-liberal economic principles.15 As already
pointed out in the Introduction above, ordo-liberalism concerns a strand of eco-
nomic philosophy that emerged in Weimar Germany and largely aimed at re-
ducing the role of the state to the sustenance of fair competition in a free market
economic order. One nevertheless fails to come to grips with this ordo-liberal
thinking when one neglects to pay attention to the strict Protestant theological
moralism on which it pivots. The ordo-liberal worldview understands free market
competition as the testing ground on which moral integrity will become mani-
fest and rewarded.16 This order of free competition between virtuous individuals
is ordained by God, the ordo-liberals believe.17 They are not interested in the his-
torical circumstances and structural conditions that exclude millions of people
from ever entering this order. They are evidently also not bothered by the disas-
trous anti-social consequences of this exclusion. That, they would seem to think,
is just a matter of a sinful and immoral reality for the police to contain as harshly
as might be required.18
A crude religious fundamentalism would seem to be at work in this thinking,
one that evinces the worst elements of the unforgiving and repressive predesti-
nation-doctrine that John Calvin introduced into Christian thinking.19 Of course,
few political elites in Europe would be so tactless as to articulate their views ex-
pressly in these crude fundamentalist terms. The question nevertheless remains
whether the undeniable concentration of all of one’s imaginative, political and
economic resources on the sustenance of a fair competition system and the con-
comitant disregard for more vexing problems of social disintegration and exclu-
sion, does not commit one by default to something all too close to the crude
religious views invoked here. A certain naturalism is evidently at work in the as-
sumption of a proper order of fair economic competition as an “obvious”
panacea for all social ills, a panacea that spares one the trouble of paying proper
attention to vexing social divisions and allows one to shrug off their anti-social
consequences as something that must simply be contained. And it is this natu-
ralism that betrays the process of de-hermeneuticisation that has already taken
root here. The end of this process, were it allowed to continue to its end, will
surely be indistinguishable from the crude fundamentalism invoked here.20 Any
political position or opinion that takes an existing social system as sound and fair
enough to render the question of significant reconstruction redundant, evidently
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considers those who make it in and into this system virtuous, and those who fail
not so virtuous. And the latter then naturally deserve whatever discontent duly
comes their way.
The rampant austerity demands that have been dominating European politics ever
since the eruption of the financial crisis are considered by many social theorists as
part and parcel of the ordo-liberal or quasi-ordo-liberal moralism that drives Euro-
pean politics.21 These austerity demands have come to require European govern-
ments to run their budgets like perfectly-sanitised businesses and to constrain their
public expenses accordingly. This ‘Protestant’ approach to government appears to
work, for the moment at least, for the northern European countries such as Ger-
many that happen to be the most vociferous proponents of austerity politics in Eu-
rope. It is evidently highly debilitating, however, in the case of the predominantly
Catholic countries of southern Europe. The latter countries have long traditions of
relying on morally and politically quite acceptable combinations of state debt and
inflationary measures to sustain socio-economic coherence and minimum levels of
social equality.22 The functional synthesis of Protestant ordo-liberal concerns with
fair and virtuous competition, on the one hand, and Catholic social welfare con-
cerns, on the other, that gave rise to a highly efficient social market economy (soziale
Marktwirtschaft)23 in post-war Germany, never took root in these southern Euro-
pean countries; hence the disastrous impact of the EU and northern European im-
position of hard Protestant austerity on peoples for whom austerity never constituted
a significant virtue, and non-austerity (the willingness of the state to incur debt and
take inflationary measures) remained a quite functional and morally less vindictive
version of sustaining social cohesion.
This is the background of the woes that plagued the French economy in recent
years. Against this background of imposed austerity on an economy not suited for
it, the huge investments that would have to be made if France wanted to reinter-
pret itself so as to respond constructively and imaginatively to its festering exclu-
sions, divisions and splits, are evidently unthinkable. But the dramatic events that
came to mark 2015 have shown that this Protestant imposition of austerity on
France may itself be beginning to crack up under the weight of its own extremism,
for it has suddenly come to light that the raised policing levels required to contain
and fence off the festering pits of God-ordained damnation around its major cities
cannot be reconciled with the austerity demands that the EU and northern Euro-
pean countries are imposing on European Member States. The massacre in Paris
on the evening of 13 November suddenly brought Hollande to confront the fact
that his security forces are hopelessly understaffed, and he was quick to announce
the appointment of almost 10 000 police and other security personnel.24 Equally
quick was Jean-Luc Mélenchon to observe astutely that it took a massacre to move
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Hollande to admit to the mistake of the debilitating austerity demands imposed on
France by Brussels.25
Is it ironic or just to be expected that the extremism of one religious de-
hermeneuticisation would finally begin to unmask the parallel signs of extremism
of another? For it surely takes an extremely confident faith in the correctness of the
free competition approach to all social ills for one not to want to reconsider this ap-
proach fundamentally when the social disintegration that is taking place right under
one’s nose explodes into bloodbaths and senseless loss of life. And just how far,
may one ask then, need this extreme confidence regarding the self-evident right-
ness of your convictions – this extreme de-hermeneuticisation of one’s beliefs –
go still before it manifestly begins to mirror the extremism and fundamentalism that
it claims to combat?26
THE STATEOF EMERGENCY – FROMCHEAP POLICING TOA
CALVINIST INVERSIONOF PAULINE TEMPORALITY
We have reflected above on what appears to be a mutation of an express or de-
fault ordo-liberalism into a set of convictions that is becoming increasingly indis-
tinguishable from the extremist and suicidal fundamentalism that it aims to curtail
and eradicate. This mutation has now given rise to a convenient justification for
cheap and expedient policing. Any suggestion that there was some design in this
process would go too far. But the question of a grossly negligent or reckless com-
plicity remains at large here. For if you allow things to deteriorate to the point
where “des français [tuent] des autres français,” and can be expected to do so
again, you have created a justification for the cheap method of policing that goes
by the name of ‘state of emergency.’ And any justification for cheaper and more
expedient policing surely resonates with the legitimacy demands of governmen-
tal programmes that understand legitimacy in terms of a demand to restrict pub-
lic expenditure to the very minimum. Invocations and declarations of states of
emergency surely offer such a justification, for this is what a state of emergency
means after all, to return to the question that I asked myself in Reims on 14 No-
vember. It effectively licences a relatively small number of police officers to do
quickly and cheaply what a much bigger police force would have had to do
painstakingly and at a much higher cost, were they bound to the regular funda-
mental rights provisions of a constitutional state.27 This is indeed why pacts be-
tween extreme forms of market liberalism and totalitarian political regimes are so
common, as Agamben also notes well in the Telerama interview.28 The temptation
to finance and run a small and inexpensive police force that guards over and con-
trols a society – instead of a more expensive extended police service with enough
personnel to engage constructively in the sustenance of peace and order – is all
too great when one cannot extract oneself from technocratic and economising
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mentalities. Agamben duly alerts us to the slippery slope between these mentali-
ties and totalitarian imaginations.
It is understandable and surely justifiable that Hollande called a state of emer-
gency after the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November. It may even be justifiable
to have extended this state of emergency from two weeks to three months (although
some justifiable doubt already raises its head here). The question is only whether
he is going to use this state of emergency as an exceptional measure that will allow
him to commence with the process of rebuilding an adequate regular police force
that can cope with the high policing demands of his socially-disintegrating cities
under regular rule of law conditions, or whether this is indeed just the beginning of
a permanent (non-exceptional) state of emergency and the end of constitutional
democracy in France. Whether he might not only restore constitutional democracy
but also use this break from the European ‘stability pact’ as the beginning of a more
incisive reconstruction of social democracy in France is the bigger question that his
own constituency and the rest of social democratic Europe are surely still pressing
upon his administration today, albeit with scant hope.29
But what if the state of emergency in France becomes permanent, as Liberation
suggested it could immediately after Hollande declared it on 14November 2016? The
tendency of a state of exception to turn into a new state of normality was already ob-
served byWalter Benjamin in the eighth thesis of hisÜber den Begriff der Geschichte.30
Agamben provides one with a profoundmetaphysical explanation of the tendency of
states of exception to turn into permanent states and thus become normal in his book
State of Exception. He argues cogently with reference to Schmitt,31 on the one hand,
and the linguist Emile Benveniste, on the other, that the state of exception could be re-
garded as the state of greatest tension between the validity of a norm and its actual
application or force.32 This state of greatest tension between the norm and its appli-
cationmay even culminate in the suspension of the application (or force) of the norm,
as long as the suspension is aimed at eventually restoring the norm. However, when
the state of exception becomes permanent, the aspiration or prospect is evidently no
longer to restore the regular application or force of the norm, and thus it mutates into
something else.When the state of emergency or exception becomes permanent, it ef-
fects a total and indeed totalitarian collapse of the distinction between the potential-
ity and actuality of the norm, or simply reflects the reality that this collapse has already
taken place. As we have seen above, Agamben traces the ever latent possibility of this
collapse – at least in the Western political imagination – to Aristotle’s unstable dis-
tinction between potentiality and actuality.33 This collapse is the essence of the de-
hermeneuticisation invoked above. When the distinction and difference between the
actuality and potentiality of a norm collapse, the scope and need for an interpretive
application of the norm disappear with it. The need for an interpretative application of
the norm is conditioned by the irreducible potentiality of the norm.
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Any attempt to reverse processes of de-hermeneuticisation of the kind that we
have outlined above would need to restore a hermeneutic regard for the irreducible
gap between the potentiality and actuality of the norm, that is, between the norm
and its application. Once one comprehends the need for interpretive application –
the need for hermeneutics, in other words – in terms of the irreducible potentiality
of the norm (that is, in terms of the fact that the norm can never be anything but the
reflection of a potential that cannot be realised), it should be evident that it is a mis-
take or confusion (or worse, a usurpation of an apocalyptic theocratic sovereignty,
as will soon become clear) to think of interpretation as the actualisation of the norm
that terminates its potentiality. The application of the norm should, from this per-
spective, always be considered as a compromise with the norm that deviates from
and even breaks with it to a greater or lesser extent, but always to some extent,
though never completely. Considered from this perspective, a temporary state of
exception is indeed the state of the greatest distance between the norm and its ap-
plication, so much so that the emergency application of the norm can hardly be
recognised as an application of the norm.
The fact that hermeneutics consists exactly in this recognition of the irreducible
distance between the norm and its application – the fact that the application of the
norm is never the realisation of the norm (hence the need for inter-pretation) – is
ironically the one crucial point that Gadamer’s epochal and magisterial study in
hermeneutics missed completely. For Gadamer – very likely because of the Aris-
totelian and Hegelian foundations of his hermeneutics, in terms of which potential-
ity and actuality always morph into one another dialectically – the application of the
norm constitutes the necessary concretisation and completion of the norm.34 It is this
unstable slippage between potentiality and actuality in the dialectics of Western
metaphysics that Agamben seeks to sidestep with his remarkable reading of the
Pauline (and Augustinian) insistence that only God’s judgment (God’s application of
the norm) can erase the terrestrial divide and distance between potentiality and ac-
tuality. And hand in hand with this insistence goes the insight that this divine judg-
ment will necessarily be the final judgment that terminates time. From this
perspective, time as such and the fact that it still continues constitute empirical evi-
dence for the plausibility and prudence of the axiomatic regard that potentiality and
actuality should never be confused with one another. The absence of any signifi-
cant reconciliation between actuality and potentiality is the condition for time, that
is, for on-going time or time that ‘remains.’ And ongoing time is the sure sign of the
unreconciled state of potentiality and actuality. No potential is ever actualised when
and as long as time goes on.
The ‘permanence’ of the permanent state of exception signals, to the contrary,
the sovereign assumption of the capacity to terminate time and to inaugurate ‘the
end of time.’ In direct contrast with a temporary state of emergency, it also no longer
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concerns the state of greatest tension between the norm and its application, but the
complete erasure of this tension that allows for the direct assumption of circum-
stantial reality under the norm, or the direct imposition of the norm on circumstan-
tial reality – an immediate fusion of norm and reality – that renders the application
of the norm (and the traversal of distance that the notion of application presup-
poses) redundant. This redundancy invariably becomes manifest as brutality, for bru-
tality is one of the key instruments or techniques with which the sovereign – by
definition then a technocratic or instrumental sovereign – erases the divide and dis-
tance between the norm and circumstantial reality that evidently resists subjection
to the norm. This brutality already becomes manifest during a temporary state of
emergency, and its efficacy invariably lures sovereignty into the sheer expediency of
an indefinite and ultimately permanent state of emergency. The crucial question that
therefore arises during a temporary state of emergency is whether the sovereign
can avoid the temptation to close the gap between the efficacy of temporary bru-
tality and the expedience of permanent brutality.35 This is the key question that now
confronts not only Francois Hollande in France, but all political leaders faced with the
task of curtailing and eradicating jihad terrorism elsewhere in Europe and the world.
Let us take a closer look at the ‘end of time’ or the ‘end time’ that ordo-liberalism,
or something closely akin to it, risks inaugurating in Europe today. The story of Ger-
many’s post-war social market economy reflects a phase of ordo-liberal thinking that
was still capable of reinterpreting itself in view of pressing socio-historical exigencies.
In this respect, German post-war ordo-liberalism certainly did not completely lose its
hermeneutic capacity for understanding itself differently in the course of time (a
core hermeneutic capacity, according to Gadamer, for whom human understand-
ing always consists in understanding differently36). The filtered or default ordo-lib-
eralism that emerged from the politics of European market integration, however, has
evidently lost this capacity for renewed contextual self-understanding; hence, for in-
stance, its blind exportation of austerity demands to countries for which these de-
mands are ill-suited. The result of this loss of hermeneutic capacity is a peculiar
mutation of the Pauline message to the early Christian communities that salvation
(the fusion of norm and reality) should not be sought in this world, and, conse-
quently, of the Augustinian theology that postponed God’s final judgment and the
ultimate separation of good and evil (the ultimate realisation of the norm) to the
end of time. It effectively brought that judgment forward by endorsing a world in
which the separate destinies of the redeemed and the damned have already be-
come glaringly visible. Ordo-liberalism would seem to have taken a short cut to the
end of time that bypassed “the time that remains.” It seems to have turned divine des-
tination – incomprehensible and unknown to all mortals and for this reason the guar-
antee for an irreducible equality and horizontality among them (to invoke here
Nancy’s beautiful phrase “l’horizontalité des morts”)37 – into a hierarchical pre-des-
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tination. Thus could the early Christian ethic of living under the law as if not living
under the law – the ὡς µὴ that Agamben explores so brilliantly in The Time that Re-
mains – turn into an ethic according to which the law, understood as an already es-
tablished system of vested patrimonial rights and entitlements, became the telling
measure of salvation and damnation.38
Ordo-liberalism can thus be said to constitute a Protestant reversal of the ‘time-
line’ envisaged by Pauline theology. It consists in the investment of faith in an earthly
order of patrimonial rights which takes this order as the realisation of God’s pre-
destined design for the universe. Pauline theology taught the early Christians to live
under the law as if not living under the law. This instruction was sustained by the
conviction that earthly law should not be confused with God’s justice. In complete
contrast, ordo-liberalism came to instruct twentieth and twenty-first century Euro-
pean Christians to live under the law because it is an actualisation of God’s justice.
The first generation of Ordo-liberals were adamant that they were concerned with
“realising the free and natural order willed by God” – “die freie, natürliche, gottge-
wollte Ordnung [zu] verwirklichen.”39 Those who are so convinced that they actu-
ally know what God had in mind for the universe, and so confident of being chosen
and able to already begin His work for Him, obviously have no reason to shy away
from the authoritarianism and extremism that might be required for executing this
divine command when reality would appear to resist the order ordained for it.
RE-HERMENEUTICISATIONANDTHE RETURNOF THE
POLITICAL: SOMECONCLUDINGREMARKS
My engagement with Agamben’s thought in “The Literary Exception” is guided by
the concern with the possibility of returning to the world and the return of the world
that his contemplation of Pauline theology in The Time that Remains offers us.
Pauline theology may appear to have contemplated a religious withdrawal from the
world, but Agamben’s reading of this theology shows that quite to the contrary – and
perhaps quite paradoxically – it allowed for the sustenance of the world. As the in-
terview with Telerama also shows clearly, Agamben evidently endorses this Pauline
theology from the perspective of an Arendtian understanding of political liberty,
that is, an understanding of political liberty as the fundamental human capacity to
liberate oneself from the necessity of economic need for the sake of the freedom to
invent and create new worlds.40 The link between the Pauline concern with the time
that remains and the Arendtian concern with political liberty in Agamben’s thought
is cogent, for it is only by grace of significant political invention that time can be said
to go on. It is significant political invention that gives more time, as Derrida may have
put it,41 and thus allows for the plausibility of an invocation of time that still remains
for us. Political liberty can, from this perspective, be regarded as a source and reser-
voir of time.
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The reduction of politics to technocratic government, that is, to the governance
of consequences and not of causes, as Agamben puts it, is the sure sign of an age
that has lost its political liberty. It is the sure sign of the reduction of political imag-
ination to the management of currently dominant conceptions of material need
and necessity. The question that Agamben prompts us to ask is whether Europe
can still step back from the age of technocracy that it appears to have entered, an
age of technocracy that shows all the signs of becoming eschatological. The tech-
nocratic reduction of the political evidently considers existing socio-economic
arrangements to be predestined realities that cannot be reinterpreted, re-imagined
and changed. They can at best be managed, controlled and repressed until the end
of time, if needs be, by resorting to and sustaining the notion of permanent emer-
gency. Extended states of emergency are indeed the ultimate technocratic gov-
ernmental response and the hallmark of de-hermeneuticised societies that no
longer endeavour to understand, reinterpret and reinvent themselves. A future that
might be significantly different is no longer possible under these conditions. That
is why the technocratic management of things until the end of time already consti-
tutes that end of time. And that is why one can plausibly talk about entering an age
of eschatological technocracy. This invocation of an eschatological technocracy
need not be accompanied by an apocalyptic vision. One can talk in this way with-
out at all having to invoke the pending end of human life on planet earth. To the
contrary, a not too distant century may well come to induce prayers that some turn
of fate may still prevent humans from exporting this ugly brutality to all corners of
the universe.
It is against this bleak background of a futureless society that the three phases of
the demise of constitutional democracy in our time must be understood: the rise of
explosive levels of democratic inequality that call for mass surveillance; the demise
of privacy guarantees consequent to raised levels of surveillance; and the demise of
civil liberty guarantees concomitant to the market demand for the cheapest possi-
ble policing. These are the extremes to which a religious conception of economic
liberty has led Europe. This religious constellation of extreme economic libertarian-
ism justifies itself today in view of the religious extremism that it has to combat. Let
us nevertheless not remain oblivious to the way in which the extreme confidence of
the former wittingly or unwittingly invited the latter and can now rely on it as its per-
manent justification. And let us spare a thought for the question of just how sick
one might still get from, and of, the endless repetition of all of this.
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31 Relying on a rather selective reading of Schmitt, one must add. See Van der Walt, Johan (2015), ‘The
Literary Exception’, New Perspectives, 23(1): 18–20.
32Agamben, Giorgio (2005), State of Exception, Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press: 32–40.
33 See note 5 above.
34 Gadamer (1975): 315: “Wir können somit als das Wahrhaft Gemeinsame aller Formen der Hermeneu-
tik herausheben, daß sich in der Ausglegung der zu verstehende Sinn erst konkretisiert und vollendet,
da aber gleichwohl dieses auslegende Tun sich vollständig an den Sinn des Textes gebunden halt.”
The regard for the norm (andmeaning as such!) as pure potential that cannot be actualised without con-
templating a theocratic or divine reconciliation of the promise of the norm or the text with concrete or
circumstantial reality, or some sovereign brutality that aspires to effect such a divine reconciliation, as
I explain further in the text above, renders the conception of application as a “concretisation” and
“completion” of the norm that remains completely bound to the norm (vollständig an den Sinn des
Textes gebunden) irredeemably counter-intuitive. Agamben appears to endorse Gadamer’s explica-
tion of application of meaning as part and parcel of the very understanding of meaning. See Agamben
(2005: 40). This is surprising and puzzling in view of the position that he takes on pages 32–39 which
precede this endorsement, and the express affirmation later (on p. 63) of Kafka’s concern with law
that is only studied but not practiced.
35 Agamben now appears to have given up on the idea (according to him, a Schmittian idea!) that tem-
porary states of exception can be the ultimate safeguard of the norm. See ‘De L’Etat du droit ą l’Etat de
Sécurité’ (fn. 6 above) for his contestation that history has shown us that temporary states of exception
invariably lead to permanent states of exception and thus to the replacement of constitutional with
dictatorial government.
36 See Gadamer (1975: 280): “Es genügt zu sagen, dass man anders versteht, wenn man überhaupt ver-
steht.” In view of the consideration elaborated in footnote 18 and the accompanying text above, one
would rather insist “da man [immer] anders [missversteht], wenn man überhaupt versteht,” without
denying, of course, that some misunderstandings are more felicitous than others.
37 See Nancy, Jean-Luc (1992), Corpus, Paris: Editions Métailié: 49.
38 CompareWeber, Max (1986),Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus II.2, available on-
line at http://www.zeno.org/Soziologie/M/Weber,+Max/Schriften+zur+Religionssoziologie/Die+
protestantische+Ethik+und+der+Geist+des+Kapitalismus. It is also available in English as The Protes-
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/weber/protes-
tant-ethic/ch05.htm.
39 Eucken, Walter (1952), Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck: 176: “Die
Wirtschaftspolitik aber soll die freie natürliche gottgewollte Ordnung verwirklichen.” For an incisive dis-
cussion of this theological foundation of ordo-liberal thinking, see Manow (2001: 188).
40 As he puts it: “Ce qu’il visent, peut-être sans en avoir conscience, car il s’agit là de transformations pro-
fondes qui touchent l’existence politique des hommes, est le passage des démocraties de masse mod-
ernes à ce que les politologues américains appellent le Security State, c’est-à-dire à une société où la
vie politique devient de fait impossible et où il ne s’agit que de gérer l’économie de la vie reproduc-
tive.” The Arendtian roots of this assessment of the security state, so evident in especially the last line
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of this statement, become even more express later in the interview. The same applies to his emphasis
on the depoliticisation of the citizen in the security state, which is central to his intervention in Le Monde
in December 2015 (see note 6 above).
41 See Derrida, Jacques (1991) Donner Le Temps 1. La Fausse Monnaie, Paris: Galilee.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Agamben, Giorgio (1998), Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
• Agamben, Giorgio (2005), State of Exception, Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
• Agamben, Giorgio (2005), The Time that Remains, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Andriychuk, Oles (2010), ‘Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition – On the Normative Value of the
Competitive Process’, European Competition Journal, 6(3): 575–610.
• Benjamin, Walter (1974), Über den Begriff der Geschichte in Gesammelte Schriften I.2, Frankfurt a. M:
Suhrkamp.
• Berghahn, Volker and Brigitte Young (2013), ‘Reflections onWerner Bonefeld’s “Freedom and the Strong
State: On GermanOrdoliberalism” and the Continuing Importance of the Ideas of Ordoliberalism to Un-
derstand Germany’s (Contested) Role in Resolving the Eurozone Crisis’, New Political Economy, 18(5):
768–778.
• Biebricher, Thomas (2011), ‘The Biopolitics of Ordoliberalism’, Foucault Studies, no. 12: 171–191.
• Blyth, Mark (2013), Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Bulmer, Simon (2014), ‘Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics’,
West European Politics, 37(6): 1244–63.
• Bulmer, Simon and William E. Paterson (2013), ‘Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Eco-
nomic Strength and Political Constraints’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20(10): 1387–1405.
• Calvin, John (2005), Institutes of the Christian Religion, Chapter 21. Available online at http://www.ccel.
org/ccel/calvin/institutes.v.xxii.html.
• Cesaratto, Sergio and Antonella Stirati (2010), ‘Germany and the European and Global Crises’, Interna-
tional Journal of Political Economy, 39(4): 56–86.
• Dardot, Pierre and Christian Laval (2014), The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society, Verso
Books.
• Derrida, Jacques (1991) Donner Le Temps 1. La Fausse Monnaie, Paris: Galilee.
• Dullien, Sebastian and Ulrike Guérot (2012), ‘The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany’s Approach
to the Euro Crisis’, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief 22, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR49_GERMANY_BRIEF.pdf.
• Eucken, Walter (1952), Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck.
• Foucault, Michel (2004), Naissance de la Biopolitique, Paris: Gallimard/Seuil.
• Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975),Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul
Siebeck): 329–344.
• Hien, Josef (2015), ‘German Ordoliberalism and the Wrecking of Europe’, UACES, http://www.uaces.
org/events/conferences/bilbao/papers/abstract.php?paper_id=673#.V102S7t95D8.
100 NewPerspectives Vol. 24, No. 1/2016
JOHAN VAN DER WALT
• Hillebrand, Rainer (2015), ‘Germany and Its Eurozone Crisis Policy: The Impact of the Country’s Or-
doliberal Heritage’, German Politics & Society, 33(1–2): 6–24.
• Joerges, Christian (2010), ‘Europa nach dem Ordoliberalismus: Eine Philippika’, Postneoliberale Recht-
sordnung? Suchprozesse in der Krise, 43(4): 394–406.
• Lechevalier, Arnaud (2015), ‘Eucken under the Pillow: The Ordoliberal Imprint on Social Europe’, in Ar-
naud Lechevalier and JanWielgohs (eds.) Social Europe. A Dead End: What the Eurozone Crisis is Doing
to Europe’s Social Dimension, Djof Publishing.
• Manow, Philip (2001), ‘Ordoliberalismus als Ökonomische Ordnungstheologie’, Leviathan, 29(2): 179–
198.
• Nancy, Jean-Luc (1992), Corpus, Paris: Editions Métailié.
• Nedergaard, Peter and Holly Snaith (2015), ‘“As I Drifted on a River I Could Not Control”: The Unin-
tended Ordoliberal Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(5):
1094–1109.
• Rosanvallon, Pierre (1987), ‘Histoire des idées keynésiennes en France’, Revue fran aise d’économie,
2(4): 22-56.
• Soros, George (1998), The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered, Public Affairs.
• Van der Walt, Johan (2014), The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty,
Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter: 246–251.
• Van der Walt, Johan (2015), ‘The Literary Exception’, New Perspectives, 23(1).
• Weber, Max (1905), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Available at https://www.marxists.
org/reference/archive/weber/protestant-ethic/ch05.html.
• Wilkinson, Michael (2015), ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination: Sec-
ond Time as Farce?’, European Law Journal, 21(3): 313–339.
101NewPerspectives Vol. 24, No. 1/2016
WHEN ONE RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM UNMASKS ANOTHER
